Coaching Witnesses by Zacharias, Fred C. & Martin, Shaun
Masthead Logo Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 87 | Issue 4 Article 4
1999
Coaching Witnesses
Fred C. Zacharias
University of San Diego
Shaun Martin
University of San Diego
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons, and the Legal Profession
Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal
by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Zacharias, Fred C. and Martin, Shaun (1999) "Coaching Witnesses," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 87 : Iss. 4 , Article 4.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol87/iss4/4
Coaching Witnesses
BY FRED C. ZACHARIAS*
& SHAUN MARTIN**
INTRODUCTION
he focus of this symposium, as it was described to us, was to
"highlight recurring questions and dilemmas that arise as
lawyers try (and sometimes fail) to conduct their trial work
within ethical boundaries established by court rules, ethical codes, and
other statutes."' In this short piece, we suggest that the problems m ethical
lawyermg often develop because lawyers think about issues m precisely
those terms; namely, how their intended conduct fits within the confines of
rules, codes, and statutes. Although we all yearn for bright-line rules that
tell us how to conduct our affairs, it is clear that ethics regulation tolerates
a range of conduct. The propriety of particular litigation activities within
the relatively broad regulatory strictures typically depends not on the
precise content of the ethics rules themselves, but rather upon the reasons
for which lawyers act.
We take as the vehicle for discussing this proposition the
issue of coaching witnesses.2 In our Professional Responsibility
"Professor, University of San Diego School of Law, San Diego, Califorma.
B.A. 1974, Johns Hopkins University; J.D. 1977, Yale University; LL.M. 1981,
Georgetown University.
** Associate Professor, University of San Diego School of Law, San Diego,
California. A.B. 1988, Dartmouth College; J.D. 1991, Harvard University.
' Letter from Susan David Dwyer, Special Projects Editor, Kentucky Law
Journal, to Fred C. Zachanas, Professor, University of San Diego School of Law
(July 1, 1998) (on file with author).
2 Although many commentators have touched on this subject, only a few have
directly addressed the ethics of witness preparation. See, e.g., John S. Applegate,
Witness Preparation, 68 TEx.L. REV. 277 (1989) (arguing that the appropriateness
of particular conduct depends upon a fact-specific evaluation ofwhatthe adversary
system requires); Richard C. Wydick, The Ethics of Witness Coaching, 17
CARDOZO L.REV 1 (1995) (arguing that a lawyer's permissible authority to affect
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courses,3 we sometimes show our students clips from two videotapes
involving witness preparation. The first, from the movie The Verdict,'
involves the preparation of a defendant anesthesiologist who allegedly
committed malpractice.5 The defendant is coached by a team of large-firm
partners and associates. Initially, the doctor's responses to his lawyer's
direct examination questions are stiff, patronizing, and climcal.6 After
forceful prompting, however, the doctor is convinced to talk m emotional,
human terms that suggest Ins caring nature and superhuman efforts on Ins
patient's behalf.7 His lawyers accomplish this transformation by pressing
witness testimony through preparation is narrow); Joseph D. Piorkowski, Jr., Note,
Professional Conduct and the Preparation of Witnesses for Trial: Defining the
Acceptable Limitations of "Coaching," 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 389 (1987)
(urging lawyers to consider their ethical responsibilities); see also, e.g., GEOFFREY
C. HAZARD, JR., ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 127-31 (1978) (discussing the
intersection of witness preparation and the subornation ofperjury). The paucity of
attention to this subject is somewhat surprising given that some eticists believe
that the conduct of attorneys m interviewing and preparing witnesses, "more than
almost anything else, gives trial lawyers their reputations as purveyors of
falsehoods." DAvID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 96
(1988).
1 The events that we discuss here are often drawn from the experiences ofone
or the other ofus. We nevertheless take literary license and refer to these activities
as "ours."
4 THE VERDICT (20th Century Fox 1982).
5 In The Verdict, a pregnant patient undergoing a routine procedure receives the
wrong anesthesia and, as a result, lapses into a fatal coma. James Mason plays the
role of a Machiavellian defense lawyer who leads a team of large firm lawyers m
defending the anesthesiologist in the resulting medical malpractice action. See id.
6 For example, when first asked what caused his patient to be deprived of
oxygen, the doctor responds, "She'd aspirated vomitus into her mask." His
attorney, upon hearing the doctor's description, counsels hun to "cut the bullshit,
please. Just say it. She threw up in her mask." The doctor immediately parrots his
lawyer's proposed characterization and responds, "She threw up in her mask." Id.
I The doctor, for example, starts (at his counsel's urging) to refer to his
patient-whom he presumably barely knew-as "Debby" rather than "she" or "the
patient." The doctor similarly alters his characterization of is role in the treatment.
The doctor initially responded that he was "one of a group" when asked if he was
Debby's anesthesiologist. His attorney responds bluntly, "You were not part of a
group. You were her anesthesiologist. Isn't that so?" The doctor immediately
relents: "Yes." Id. The doctor's testimony, after extensive preparation, concludes
with his wholehearted adoption of his attorney's characterization of his activities
in bringing "30 years of medical experience to bear [on a] patient riddled with
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the doctor to adopt substitute terms and phraseology that they suggest and
by applauding the witness when he shows his emotions.'
In the second tape, from the television series L.A. Law,9 attorney
Michael Kuzak converts a similarly climcal character witness who "see[s]
shades of gray m everyone 1 into a one-sided, fully favorable witness.1'
For example, when asked, "[H]ave you ever known [the defendant] to be
violent?", the witness initially responds, "Not really " Kuzak immediately
replies, "The answer is 'No.' ..2 The witness soon adopts this response. The
witness is strongly influenced by Kuzak's statement that his testimony will
be useless unless he can adopt wholeheartedly supportive characteriza-
tions.13 Wanting to help his friend, the witness ultimately incorporates the
exact phrases that Kuzak has previously employed in preparing the witness
to testify 14
Our students typically are unified in their responses to the tapes
described above. The Verdict lawyer, they say, has done nothing wrong. He
has not changed the substance of the testimony but has instead simply
shaped it by demonstrating to the witness how he will appear to the jury
The changes in the witness's testimony, they argue, are sinply a matter of
complications" in an effort to "reach[ ] down into death" and save her. Id.
' See supra notes 6-7 This prodding comes in a fairly intimidating setting in
which the lead attorney practices a vigorous and up tempo direct examination with
the doctor in front of twelve partners and associates who sit as a mock jury and
interject comments. As the pace of the testimony increases, the lead attorney's
reactions seem more like an order or direct substitute for the doctor's words than
a suggestion or explanation of the effect of the doctor's testimony. See THE
VERDICT, supra note 4.
9L.A. Law (NBC television broadcast).
1 Id. In this episode, the witness is a humanities professor and the best friend
of a colleague accused of murder. The lawyer plans to call the professor as a
character witness. The witness wishes to help the defendant, whom he truly likes
and admires.
" Kuzak is particularly concerned about the witness's willingness to volunteer
that the defendant has previously exhibited a temper and, like many people, has not
always gotten along with everyone. See id.
12 Id.
13 Kuzak, after the witness has expressed his unwillingness to perjure himself,
states, "I'm not asking you to lie. But if you can't express your friendship with
some conviction, then I can't put you up there [to testify]." Id.
" The witness ultimately testifies at trial in seeming direct contradiction to his
earlier practice testimony-using the precise language suggested by Kuzak-that the
defendant was a "gentle, caring individual" who was "utterly incapable of the
brutality with winch he's been charged." Id.
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presentation, even though these revisions may have a sign ficant effect on
the jury's response. In contrast, the students believe that Kuzak-the L.A.
Law lawyer-has acted outrageously. He has promoted perjury, the
class agrees, because he has in effect changed the story that the witness will
tell.
At this point, we push the students to the wall. "What if," we ask, "we
write out potential questions and possible answers for a sophisticated
witness m a complicated case? We tell the witness that we are not trying to
put words in his mouth but, as a starting point for preparing the witness and
to save time, we are showing hun various questions and answers for Ins
reaction." The students first react scornfully to this proposition and assert
that we would be suborning perjury were we to do so. However, the more
we repeat that we are willing to accept as correct any account that the
witness tells us, the more the students move towards the position that this
conduct simply constitutes a legitimate attempt to help the witness's
presentation. The law and ethics rules only forbid a lawyer from presenting
evidence that she"5 knows to be false.' 6 Helping one's client to present the
most persuasive case is, after all, the lawyer's job.
Our Socratic questions, of course, reflect more than just hypothetical
scenarios. The practice that we describe to our students reflects the actual
manner in which lawyers obtain much of the evidence that is presented to
tribunals-not only trial evidence. Pretrial affidavits and declarations
typically are obtained almost precisely in the way we describe in our final
"hypothetical." An attorney prepares a sworn declaration that contains the
evidence needed to prevail on a motion and she then forwards this draft
submission to an individual-usually her client or an employee-for his
review and signature. When forwarding the draft declaration, the attorney
may or may not expressly inform the recipient that she is prepared to edit
" To avoid confusion, we refer to the lawyer facing a potential ethical quandary
as female and the other actors (e.g., clients, witnesses, opposing counsel) in the
process as male.
16 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(4) (1998)
(forbidding a lawyer to "knowingly offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be
false").
In referring to "the rules" or "the codes" in this article, we refer to the body of
professional regulation that is encompassed by the MODEL CODE OFPROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY (1980), the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1998),
and the state variations of those codes. Because most jurisdictions' codes are
similar with respect to the subjects that we discuss, we will not identify specific
provisions m the different codes. We will instead confine our references to the most
commonly adopted version of these provisions, the Model Rules.
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the draft to comport with the objective truth. In any event, she is, m fact,
quite willing to do so.
Whether or not the lawyer makes any such express statement about the
fungible nature of the draft, declarants ordinarily sign and return the
affidavit provided to them with no (or only insubstantial) changes. The
court accordingly receives evidence that is in reality the lawyer's own
carefully crafted submission. The L.A. Law clip and the prepared testimony
hypothetical thus parallel, in dramatic form, the type of witness coaching
that routinely occurs in the practice of even the most well-respected of
attorneys.
The students' responses to ourhypothetical scenarios similarly parallel
the approach of many real world litigators. These individuals often focus
exclusively upon the fact that the ethics rules forbid directly only the
knowing subornation ofperjury.7 The hasty conclusion too often drawn by
these litigators is that a lawyer acts ethically so long as her coaching or
declaration-drafting practices would not be viewed, under criminal law
principles, as the deliberate subornation of perjury Everything else, they
believe, merely entails a permissible attempt to put the evidence in its most
favorable light.
Our classroom dialogue exposes these common assumptions as well as
the foundation upon which this symposium is based. A lawyer or student
who focuses solely on the content of the rules, codes, and statutes m order
to evaluate ethics will conclude automatically that The Verdict and
declaration-obtammg attorneys act properly in the way they prepare
testimony, but that Kuzak may have acted questionably. The codes teach
us that a lawyer can neither tell a client to lie nor encourage a witness to
commit perjury." However, the lawyer is requwredto be loyal to the client 9
and to communicate fully with him.20 The intersection of these ethical
provisions presumably entitles the client to know (or to have the witnesses
know) how ins story will sound on the stand. The codes and rules similarly
allow the lawyer to provide clients with efficient, professional assistance
in preparing to testify Ipso facto, it seems, even showing the client a
1 7 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3.
See rd. Rule 1.2(d) ("A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist
a client, m conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent . ").
19 See id. Rule 1.7 cmt ("Loyalty is an essential element in the lawyer's
relationship to a client.").
20 See id. Rule 1.4(b) ("A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably
necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation.").
1998-991 1005
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
preliminary list of questions and answers or a draft declaration in the
lawyer's own words is ethically permissible.
But is it? Is showing proposed sworn testimony to an incipient witness
any different than the L.A. Law lawyer's conduct in pressuring the
character witness to change his story by truthfully telling the witness that
he will not be called to the stand to help his friend if his evaluation of the
defendant is mixed? Conversely, is The Verdict lawyer's clear effort to
change the words that the doctor-witness uses before the jury and the
demeanor he projects any more "ethical"? If we are honest about not only
the L.A. Law and The Verdict lawyers, but also the actual practices
described above, it seems obvious that the attorney in each instance hopes
to convince the witness to say the desired things and to say them in the
suggested way Tis is the hope even if the proposed testimony may not be
true and even if-as is certainly the case-the witnesses would not use the
proposed words or present the desired image without the lawyer's
intervention.
We trust that these examples show that the terms of the codes
themselves do not delimit the contours of proper behavior. The codes
instead depend upon lawyers to exercise discretion. More to the point, in
litigation situations like those discussed above, any attorney who thinks
that she can determine ethical conduct simply by looking at and following
the letter of the codes will not even be trying to act ethically The effort
must also include deep consideration of what conduct is appropriate and
what conduct is not. The correct resolution of ethical issues depends, at
least in part, upon the reasons why a lawyer engages, or wishes to engage,
in a particular type of coaching.
If that is the case, however, one might expect that a professional code
concerned with the advancement of ethical conduct would focus expressly
on the lawyer's intent and state of mmd. Yet the codes avoid doing so for
at least two reasons. First, because intent is a subjective element, the
enforcement of intent-based rules is difficult. Second, in most cases, the
effect of a lawyer's objective conduct on clients, third parties, and the legal
system does not depend upon the lawyer's state of mind. The codes
accordingly tend to treat that effect (or the nature of the conduct itself) as
dispositive, thus making the lawyer's purpose seem irrelevant.2'
Nevertheless, the true morality of a lawyer's conduct-both whether she
has acted properly in a particular case and whether she has adopted an
amoral persona or role in pursuing her client's case-inevitably depends
heavily upon why the lawyer has acted in a particular way One can
2 1See generally MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT.
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envision scenarios m which The Verdict lawyer, the L.A. Law attorney, and
the declaration-writing counsel each could be deemed to be either an
unprofessional or a reasonable advocate. 22 In our hypothetical (or not so
hypothetical) situations, every lawyer can be characterized alternatively as
trying to foster perjury or as attempting to educate the witness. The key to
how society would view the "ethics" of the attorney's conduct would
depend on why the lawyer chose to act m a particular way, how far she was
willing to pursue her conduct, and the nature of her client.' It probably
2 If, for example, a lawyer is dealing with a witness who has difficulty
expressing his ideas, there probably is nothing wrong with helping hun to tell his
story. See, e.g., CHARLES W WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 12.4.3, at 647-
48 (1986) ("Lawyer interviews with witnesses in preparation for testimony have
become an accepted and standard practice in the United States.") (footnote
omitted). Similarly, if a witness is unfamiliar with a courtroom or intimidated by
the prospect oftestifying orbeing cross-examined, a lawyerreasonably may put the
witness at ease by practicing with him or suggesting mechamsms by which he can
overcome his nervousness. See, e.g., State v. McCormick, 259 S.E.2d 880, 882
(N.C. 1979) ("It is not improper for an attorney to prepare his witness for trial, to
explain the applicable law and to go over before trial the attorney's questions
and the witness'[s] answers so that the witness will be ready for his appearance in
court, will be more at ease because he knows what to expect, and will give his
testimony in the most effective manner that he can."); Applegate, supra note 2, at
298, 322 (discussing valid and potentially invalid justifications for preparing
witnesses). It may also be perfectly acceptable for a lawyer to draft a witness's
declaration in the lawyer's own words in order to expedite its signing or to avoid
hearsay or other evidentiary objections that might flow from the witness's use of
his own language.
On the other hand, the more that a lawyer substitutes her own words for the
witness's and the more those substitutions change the facts to which the witness
will testify, the greater the risk of suborning perjury or the creation of "false
evidence." See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(4)
(forbidding lawyers to "knowingly" introduce false evidence); id. Rule 3.3(c)
(authorizing lawyers, in their discretion, to refuse to offer evidence that they
"reasonably believe" to be false). Some commentators have even suggested that
helping to change the demeanor of a witness constitutes impermissible tampering
with the underlying evidence every bit as much as helping to change the facts
presented. See, e.g., Applegate, supra note 2, at 298-99 (discussing problems of
"molding" a witness's demeanor); Piorkowski, supra note 2, at 404-05 (discussing
when influencing demeanor may be tantamount to changing the facts).
' Compare, for example, a lawyer who observes in passing to a witness that
"Your testimony isn't very persuasive," with a lawyer who makes the same
observation with a wink.
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would not depend primarily on what the rules say about the particular
conduct at issue.
Our point, of course, is not that lawyers should ignore the professional
codes. In the coaching context, for example, the rules contain many
express, binding, and useful commands. Lawyers may not assist a client in
committing illegality (e.g., perjury). 24 A lawyer also may not knowingly
offer false evidence25 or "fail to disclose" information necessary to avoid
assisting a client's fraud.26 Nor may lawyers use third parties (including
witnesses) to do that wnch they could not do themselves.27
The rules sunultaneously grant lawyers a significant degree of
potentially countervailing discretion. The codes establish that lawyers,
rather than clients, control technical or "tactical" decisions.' But lawyers
must nevertheless act loyally to their clients.29 Lawyers should also not
overly judge or control their clients' activities."
The express commands inthe rules also are supplementedbyteachlngs
ofmore general application. Lawyers are to retain independentjudgment. 31
They must avoid "conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or mis-
24 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFEssIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 (forbidding
counseling or assisting a client m illegal conduct).
5 See id. Rule 3.3(a)(4).26 Id. Rule 3.3(a)(2).
27 See, e.g., id. Rule 8.4(a) ("It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to
violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct. or do so through
the acts of another.").
' See, e.g., id. Rule 1.2(a) (allocating to lawyers control over the "means by
which [client objectives] are to be pursued.").
29 See, e.g., id. Rule 1.7 cmt. (discussing loyalty); Rule 1.6 (adopting a strict
rule of confidentiality).
31 For example, lawyers are only required to remedy client misconduct towards
a tribunal when they "know" that misconduct has occurred. See id. Rule 3.3 (a); cf
zd. Rule 3.3(c) (granting a lawyer discretion not to introduce evidence that she
"reasonably believes is false.").
31 The codes accordingly give lawyers control over certain decisions and
suggest that lawyers may refrain from obtaining every potential benefit available
to their client. See, e.g., id. Rule 1.2 (giving lawyers control over the means of
litigation); id. Rule 1.2 cmt. (giving lawyers discretion not to press advantages).
The codes accord lawyers discretion to act, or not to act, in numerous other
situations as well. See, e.g., id. Rule 1.6(b) (setting forth exceptions to confiden-
tiality); id. Rule 3.3(c) (giving lawyers discretion not to use certain evidence). See
generally Fred C. Zachanas, Reconciling Professionalism and Client Interests, 36
WM. & MARY L. REV 1303 (1995) (describing lawyers' general reactions to the
discretionary authority granted m the professional codes).
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representation."' Lawyers have conflicting obligations to clients and the
courts.3 Attorneys sometimes must considerthirdparty or societal interests
that are superior to their clients' 34 For witness testimony, m particular, the
codes give each lawyer discretion to "refuse to offer evidence that the
lawyer reasonably believes is false."'35 The import of these provisions is that
while attorneys should give weight to values incorporated into the codes
(such as partisanship and loyalty), they cannot rely on them as a means of
avoiding the exercise of moral discretion.
How can such discretion be exercised, to take our example, m the
coaching context? The lawyer's justification for her conduct cannot alone
provide the answer. In every case, after all, a lawyer could rationalize her
efforts m perfecting a witness's presentation as driven by the laudable goal
of being loyal to her client.
The key, as one of us has suggested before,36 lies m the lawyer's
maintenance of objectivity Attorneys coach clients in every case,
both before and during trial.37 Under the American adversary sys-
32 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(c).
33 See, e.g., id. Rule 3.3 (describing lawyers' obligations to tribunals).
' See, e.g., id. Rules 1.6, 3.3(b) (establishing exceptions to strict confiden-
tiality).
351 Id. Rule 3.3(c).
36 See Zacharias, supra note 31 (discussing the reaction of lawyers to the avail-
ability of discretion in the codes).
17 Lawyers would be remiss if they did not prepare their witnesses for the
pressures of the courtroom and the tricks of cross-examination. See ROBERTO
ARON & JONATHAN L. ROSNER, How TO PREPARE WITNESSES FOR TRIAL § 1.01
(Trial Practice Series 1988) (arguing that the preparation of witnesses is the most
important aspect of trial advocacy); Applegate, supra note 2, at 289 ("The
obligation to prepare [witnesses] is clear from the duties of competence and
zealousness, however, the extent of that obligation is not clear."). In the view of at
least some commentators, such preparation typically should include "possible ways
m whch the witness might respond to [argumentative] questions." John G. Koeltl
& Paul C. Palmer, PreparngA Witness to Testify: Addendum, in LITIGATION 5, 36
(PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. H4-5135, 1992); cf
Wydick, supra note 2, at 52 (arguing that witness preparation should be designed
to mmnimze its effect on the facts the witness will describe).
To be realistic, lawyers inevitably affect witnesses' testimony, at least to some
extent, when the lawyers speak to witnesses in the course of gathering evidence.
In practice, therefore, lawyers can begin the process of preparing the witnesses for
trial at the investigation stage. See, e.g., MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE
15 (1980) ("[E]very lawyer knows that the 'preparing' of witnesses may embrace
a multitude of other measures, including some ethical lapses believed to be more
1998-991 1009
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tern,38 there is nothing wrong with helping a witness to make his point
clearly, or even in noting truthful, useful observations that the witness
might make. 9 Indeed, the very foundation of the adversarial process is the
belief that the presence of partisan lawyers will sharpen the presentation of
the issues forjudicial resolution ° The less sophisticated or experiencedthe
client, the more he needs such assistance.41
The primary danger of coaching is the possibility that a lawyer may so
change a witness's presentation that the resulting testimony is either false
or conveys an incorrect impression about the facts that cross-examination
common than we would wish. [T]he process often extends beyond helping [to]
organize what the witness knows, and moves m the direction of helping the witness
to know new things."); Wydick, supra note 2, at 9-11 (discussing ways in which
lawyers may affect witness testimony).
38 Lawyers in other countries, by contrast, find the very notion of preparing
witnesses abhorrent. See Mary C. Daly, The Ethical Implications of the
Globalization ofthe Legal Professzon: A Challenge to the Teaching ofProfessional
Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century, 21 FoRDHAMINT'LL.J. 1239, 1249-50
n.37 (1998) (describing the Australian view that preparing witnesses is unethical
and the Canadian view that it is illegal). In England, barristers typically do not even
interview witnesses before trial. See, e.g., Gordon Van Kessell,AdversaryExcesses
in the American Criminal Trial, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REv 403,435 (1992); Karen
L.K. Miller, Zip to Nil?" A Comparison of American and English Lawyers'
Standards of Professional Conduct, in CivIL PRACTICE AND LITIGATION
TECHNIQUES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 199,204 (A.L.I.-A.B.A. Continuing Legal
Educ. 1995).
39 See JEFFREY L. KESTLER, QUESTIONING TECHNIQUES AND TACTICS §§ 9.02,
9.04, 9.31 (Trial Practice Series 1992) (noting ways in which witness preparation
is important to the adversary system); cf. Wydick, supra note 2, at 12 (noting the
responsibility of an adversarial lawyer to present the relevant material m a
"coherent and convincing manner").
40 See Applegate, supra note 2, at 340-41 (noting ways in which witness
preparation supports the theory of adversarial advocacy); cf Lon Fuller, The
Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 31 (Harold J. Berman ed., 1961)
("The judge cannot know how strong an argument is until he has heard it from the
lips of one who has dedicated all the powers of his mind to its formulation."). See
generally Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring theEthics ofProsecutonal Tnal Practice:
Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV 45, 54-55 (1991) (identifying the
theory of the adversary system).
41 See, e.g., ARON &ROSNER, supra note 37, at 84; Koeltl & Palmer, supra note
37, at 22 (noting factors that influence the need for pre-deposition witness
preparation).
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cannot counteract.42 Different clients require different levels of assistance
in formulating and expressing their thoughts. A lawyer who maintains
objectivity nevertheless can recognize two ethical red flags in the course
of coaching a client or witness. First, an attorney can notice that she is, in
fact, suggesting changes in the witness's presentation for the purpose of
obtaining false evidence.43 Second, she can notice that the changes she
suggests are either inconsistent with previous information the witness has
provided or are uniformly adopted by the witness without question. Either
signals the possibility that the lawyer, perhaps even inadvertently, may be
inducing false evidence.
Let us suppose that the self-aware lawyer observes one of these signals.
On a rigid reading of the rules, the lawyer could conclude that she
nevertheless still does not "know" that any false evidence exists and that
loyalty to her client thus militates in favor ofusing the altered testimony 44
An approach that requires the lawyer to consider the spirit of the codes as
well, however, would require the lawyer to discuss these developments
with her client45 and to consider a refusal to use the evidence." In the end,
42 Model Rule 3.3 makes clear that the production of false evidence is an evil
that the code drafters wish lawyers to avoid. However, the codes preclude lawyers
from introducing such evidence only m situations m which a lawyer "knows" that
this evidence is false. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
3.3(a)(4) (1998).
43 The codes suggest only a distinction between "knowing" and "unknowing"
presentation of false evidence. See id. Rule 3.3. By contrast, the distinction we
suggest here is between inadvertently and intentionally trying (or hoping) to
produce false evidence.
"We assume, for purposes of this discussion, that the use of false evidence
would be tactically wise m the particular case. Cf HAZARD,supra note 2, at 129-30
(discussing the questionable conclusion that cross-examination will ferret out false
testimony).
41 The Model Rules expressly require lawyers to discuss "the status of a matter"
with clients, but only vaguely suggest that the lawyer discuss moral issues as well.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4(a). Compare ld. Rule 1.4
(requiring commniumcation with clients) with id. Rule 2.1 (requiring lawyers to
"exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice"). To the
extent the rules encourage attorneys to engage m moral discourse with clients, they
do so by giving lawyers discretion in certain situations and by noting the existence
of the sometimes conflicting values of client autonomy, the interests of third
parties, and the goals of courts and the legal system. See Zachanas, supra note 31,
at 1357-62 (discussing moral discourse between lawyers and clients).
"The Model Rules give lawyers discretion in this area, but neither require
active consideration of this option nor provide guidelines as to when its utilization
1998-991 1011
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the "tactical" decision of how to prepare the witness and what testimony to
use is one upon which a lawyer must actively reflect. 7
Let us consider another example from the real world as typical of the
type of ethical considerations that attorneys should address. A standard
probation condition imposed upon conviction for alcohol-related crimes m
California requires the recipient to participate mAlcoholics Anonymous!'
The difficulty engendered by this condition is that Alcoholics Anonymous
meetings are (as the name implies) anonymous. Alcoholics Anonymous
provides a sign-m sheet that probationers can complete m order to indicate
their attendance. This list, however, only indicates the individual's initial
presence; it does not reflect whether the person signing the list actually
attended the full meeting.
Many California probationers were believed to exploit this loophole by
presenting sign-m sheets to the court as evidence of their attendance even
when they had not, in fact, obtained the benefits oftheir required participa-
tion. Various California judges, upon learning of this problem, devised a
solution: they began to "quz" probationers when they appeared before the
court to establish the completion of the terms of their probation. Judges
typically asked the defendant "What step are you on?," a question that any
true participant m Alcoholics Anonymous would easily be able to answer.
would be appropriate. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
3.3(a)(4). Lawyers thus may well follow personal or financial incentives m the
exercise of their discretion. See, e.g., Zacharias, supra note 31, at 1327-50
(discussing various lawyer-based incentives, as opposed to client-based ones, that
may affect the exercise of discretion).
47 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 (allocating to
lawyers the decision making authority over the means employed m litigation).
It is beyond the scope of tlus Article to identify the precise methods that
attorneys should use to divine etlucal conduct m the coaching context Others have
begun thatprocess. JohnApplegate, for example, "suggests thatthe appropriateness
of any witness preparation technique should depend on whether the structure of the
adversary system requires such a technique in the particular context in which it is
employed." Applegate, supra note 2, at 282. Richard Wydick goes further and
argues that a lawyer must prepare a witness "in the manner least likely to harm the
quality of the witness's testimony." Wydick, supra note 2, at 52. Joseph
Piorkowski takes the more preliminary approach-consistent with tis Article's
precepts-that lawyers should consider "whether their witness preparation
techniques may have the effect of inducing a witness to falsify or rmsrepresent
material facts, either expressly through actual testimony or implicitly through
demeanor." Piorkowski, supra note 2, at 390.
48 See, e.g., CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 13352, 13352.5 (Deering 1999).
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This simple judicial inquiry often resulted m a bewildered look on the part
of the probationer and a resulting order for the continuation of probation.49
Califorma public defenders-as repeat players m the process-became
aware of this practice contemporaneously with its development. They were
forced to consider their appropriate response. Public defenders, like all
attorneys, have a duty ofloyaltyto their clients.50 Simultaneously, however,
lawyers have both a legal and ethical duty not to suborn perjury 51 These
competing principles manifested themselves in the internal discussions of
California public defenders as to whether they should "prepare!' their
clients for the judge's anticipated questions by "reminding" them of the
various steps of the Alcoholics Anonymous program.
Public defenders who looked exclusively at the rules seemed mexora-
bly to come to the conclusion that they were not only allowed to so coach
their clients, but perhaps were even ethically required to do so. The terms
of the California Rules of Professional Conduct do not flatly prohibit
informing a client of the usual questions and of what permissible answers
might entail. The rules would prohibit coaching in the setting described
above only if it is performed (1) with knowledge that the probationer has
not in fact attended any meetings; (2) with knowledge that the probationer
is not, in fact, on a particular step; and (3) with the intent to induce the
client to perjure himself by stating that he is on a given step when in fact
he is not.52 Public defenders who chose to coach their clients took care not
to inquire into any of these elements. They characterized their intent as
snply that of an advocate who wished to advise her client of an issue that
was likely to arise before the tribunal. As a result, the public defenders who
9 The information regarding the effect of probation-based Alcoholics Anony-
mous on California courts is based on Professor Shaun Martin's personal
knowledge through observation, discussions with students, and conversations with
practicing attorneys.
50 See, e.g., RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE STATE BAR OF CAL.
Rules 3-300, 3-310 (1996).
51 See, e.g., CAL.BUS. &PROF. CODE § 6068(d) (West 1998) (requiring lawyers
to employ "such means only as are consistent with truth, and never to seek to
mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or
law."); RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE STATE BAR OF CAL. Rule 5-200
(1996) (implementing § 6068(d)).
52 See RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE STATE BAR OF CAL. Rule 5-
200 (1996). Indeed, as long as the client truthfully testified that he was given a
step-whether he had actually attended any of the required meetings or not-there
would not even be any perjury to begin with, much less any that the lawyer had
wilfully induced.
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focused on the literal content of the rules ultimately engaged in conduct
that, as in the L.A. Law hypothetical, many would consider to be clearly
unethical; namely, "coaching" that resulted m deceptive, nsleading, and
perhaps false testimony about the probationer's alleged participation in
Alcoholics Anonymous.
Other California public defenders faced with the same dilemma
responded differently These public defenders examined not only the terms
of the ethics rules, but also their goals, the reasons for the contemplated
coaching, and the conduct the system expects of a reasonable, objective
lawyer. They concluded that the contemplated coaching was intended,
improperly, to put words into a witness's mouth that did not, in fact,
accurately convey reality. They reasoned that attorneys legitimately
concerned that their clients might actually have forgotten the basic precepts
of the Alcoholics Anonymous program could effectively jog the clients'
memories without the lengthy explication and coaching that would
facilitate perjury The contrasting conclusions reached by the two sets of
California public defenders demonstrate the dichotomous results achieved
when a lawyer bases her conduct upon the reasons for which she acts rather
than upon the mere content of the rules.
Compare this approach to the one taken by the District of Columbia
Bar in the ethics opinion that most directly considers the issue of witness
coaching. 1 The D.C. Bar addressed the propriety of the conduct of lawyers
who prepared testimony for witnesses or suggested answers to witnesses,
the basis ofwhich did not first derive from the witnesses themselves.' The
D.C. Bar's opinion assumed that "the proper focus is indeed on the
substnce of the witness's testimony which the lawyer has, in one way or
another, assisted in shaping; and not on the manner of the lawyer's
involvement."5s The opinion concludes that neither the nature of nor the
intent underlying the lawyer's conduct has "significance so long as the
substance of that testimony is not, so far as the lawyer knows or ought to
know, false or misleading." 56
s3 See D.C. Bar, Formal Op. 79 (1979) [hereinafter Formal Op. 79]. The Bar
issued its opinion based upon provisions that follow MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102 (1980) and that were substantially
identical to the provisions of the Model Rules.
I Formal Opinion 79 specifically addressed whether lawyers could themselves
write direct testimony of witnesses for submission to administrative agencies and,
more broadly, "the ethical limitations on a lawyer's suggesting the actual language
in which a witness's testimony is to be presented. "Formal Op. 79, supra note
53.
51 Id. (emphasis added).
56 Id.
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The D.C. Bar's approach stems from a literal reliance on the mens rea
elements of the D.C. Bar Code of Professional Responsibility 57 The
difficulty with the decision, of course, is that the lawyer who wishes to help
the client present false or misleading evidence can easily do so without
"knowing" of its falsity So long as the focus is, m the D.C. Bar's words,
"not on the manner of the lawyer's involvement,""8 the lawyer can justify
his complicity on the simple basis of loyalty to the client's interests.
The D.C. Bar's analytical regime would immunize lawyers who
contemplate coaching (such as the California public defenders) from the
need for introspection. The D.C. Bar opinion suggests that even if an
attorney deliberately coaches precisely in order to shape and/or distort her
client's testimony, the lawyer still does not act unethically so long as the
attorney does not know that the resulting testimony is untrue. This focus
radically conflicts, we assert, with the deeper personal analysis that should
govern the conduct of attorneys.59
5SeeD.C.BARCODEOFPROFESSIONALRESPONSIBiLrrY (1972). The Codewas
in effect at the time of Formal Opinion 79. The D.C. Bar did not adopt the ABA's
Model Rules of Professional Conduct until the mid- 1980s. See Preface to D.C. BAR
RULES: APPENDIX A. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1998).
8 Formal Op. 79, supra note 53.
59 The deficiency of the D.C. Bar's approach is exemplified by common
coaching practices in civil discovery. Lawyers in pretrial settings typically use pre-
existing documentary evidence to prepare clients and witnesses for their
depositions. See THEODORE Y. BLUMOFF Er AL., PRETRIAL DISCOVERY: THE
DEVELOPMENT OF PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT § 67, at 188 (1993) (discussing
deposition preparation). Recogmzmgthatjurors emphasize the significance of such
documents, lawyers sometimes attemptto dissuade friendlywitnesses from offering
testimony that conflicts with the written records. Some lawyers also assume that
jurors will believe even false testimony, so long as it is not contradicted by
contemporaneous documents. Accordingly, it is common practice for such lawyers
to encourage a witness to review key documents produced during discovery (and
transcripts of earlier testimony) before his deposition. The witness can thus predict
what the other side can, and cannot, safely contend. The witness may, perhaps, then
respond falsely to the questions he is asked.
The lawyer, of course, owes a duty to help the witness avoid surprise. See, e.g.,
id. § 67, at 182-85 (preparing friendly witnesses for depositions is a lawyer's
pretrial duty); A. Darby Dickerson, The Law and Ethics of Civil Depositions, 57
MD. L. REv 273, 323-24 (1998). We do not mean to suggest that preparing a
witness is per se improper, nor do we dispute that showing the witness
documentary evidence can have legitimate auns. In reality, however, the
information that the lawyer provides often is designed to enable the witness to
respond creatively to the available documentary evidence. Witnesses can feel
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An exclusive reliance upon the literal content of the ethics rules does
have one potential advantage. By equating legal ethics with mere compli-
ance with express ethical prohibitions, the system perhaps would advance
a rough degree of adversarial equality The duty of loyalty, one might
argue, requires every attorney to advance the interests of his client to the
maximum degree possible so long as this conduct is not barred by
expressly codified ethical commands. The arguable advantage of such a
regime is that particular clients will not be disadvantaged in the adversarial
process because they employ an "ethical" counsel (who fails, for example,
to coach them through the questionable means described above) while
confronting an unethical counterpart who employs these means and yet
complies with express ethical commands.6
The rules, however, do not in fact attempt to ensure such equality of
unethical behavior, nor should they The professional codes expressly and
repeatedly allow and encourage lawyers to engage in discretionary moral
decisionmaking even if their adversary does not share a similar ethical
view 6 1 An equality rationale thus does not appear to motivate the
contemporary ethical focus. We should not prefer an alternative regime in
any event; it seems bizarre to set the ethical bar at its absolute lowest in an
effort to convince no attorney to rise above it. Tis is not, we think, what
it means to be a legal professional, much less one with moral and ethical
discretion.
Our point is a simple one. Coaching, like many other tactics and
conduct in litigation settings, is not-and perhaps cannot be62-fully
relatively safe m articulating untrue claims so long as their testimony does not
conflict with the written evidence. Attorneys who "coach" their clients or witnesses
to fashion a story that is consistent with the written record can simultaneously
foster the introduction of false testimony while remaining ignorant of the true set
of facts. Under the D.C. Bar Opinion's approach, lawyers are justified m
introducing the altered testimony on the grounds that the lawyers do not "know"
that it is false. See Formal Op. 79, supra note 53.
6 This dilemma is discussed in Fred C. Zacharias, The Civil-Criminal
Distinction in ProfessionalResponsibility, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGALISSUES 165, 182-
83 (1996) (discussing difficulties m having lawyers apply different roles to
different clients).
61 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.2, 1.16, 2.1,
3.3(c) (1998).
62 As Wigmore noted long ago:
[T]o prevent the abuse by any definite rule seems impracticable.
It would seem, therefore, that nothing short of an actual fraudulent
conference for concoction of testimony could properly be taken notice of;
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addressed in the codes.63 That arises m part because professional code
drafters cannot conceive of and address all issues and m part because the
propriety of even identical conduct may vary from case to case.6 4 The
consequence of that reality is that lawyers cannot rely fully on the terms of
the codes m resolving ethical issues that arise.65 Deciding how to conduct
"trial work within ethical boundaries established by court rules, ethical
codes, and other statutes"66 is the easy part of the litigator's job. The hard
part is remembering that identifying ethical practice goes far beyond that
task.
there is no specific rule of behavior capable of being substituted for the
proof of such facts.
2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §788 (2d ed.
1923).
63 Cf Bruce A. Green, Zealous Representation Bound: The Intersection of the
Ethical Codes and the CrimmnalLaw, 69 N.C. L. REV 687,705 (1991) ("The Code
fails to impose any significant limit on a lawyer's conduct in preparing his own
witnesses for trial, with the result that the propriety of the lawyer's conduct must
be defined primarily by criminal laws dealing with subornation of perjury.")
(footnotes omitted).
" See Fred C. Zachanas, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes:
Theory, Practice, and the Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NOTRE DAME L.
REV 223, 261 (1993) (discussing the relationship between specificity in code
provisions and their ability to cover a broad range of conduct).
" Cf Zachanas, supra note 31, at 1327-50 (discussing some of the many
contexts in whch the codes terms provide only limited guidance for lawyer
conduct).
" Letter from Susan David Dwyer, supra note 1.
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